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Abstract 
In computing the term spoofing historically referred to the creation of TCP/IP packets using another device’s valid IP 
address to gain an advantage.  The Electronic Product Code (EPC) RFID system was investigated to test the efficacy of 
spoofing a valid tag response to basic requests. A radio frequency transmission device was constructed to determine 
whether a valid reader could distinguish between the response of an actual tag and a spoofed response. The results show 
that the device was able to successfully deceive the EPC reader and further, to replace actual tag responses with a 
spoofed response. The potential for such attacks against inventory systems using the EPC standard would be significant 
in terms of both operational and actual costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) relies on transponders which are incorporated into an object for the purpose of 
identification or tracking. The transponder (or tag) may be used to store information and will respond to signals sent by a 
transceiver (RFID reader). Increasingly such technology is being incorporated into supply chain management systems 
throughout the world and is expected to eventually replace traditional bar-coding systems. A barrier to the uptake of 
RFID systems was the lack of standards which has been addressed by the creation and dissemination of the Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) standard. The EPC standard governs the whole scope of an RFID system including the operation of 
compliant RFID tags and readers.  
 
“The Electronic Product Code is an identification scheme for universally identifying physical objects via Radio 
Frequency Identification tags and other means” (EPCglobal, 2005a, p.9). The electronic product code (EPC) standards 
were created by EPCglobal as an open, community based approach to promote the use of RFID technology in supply 
chain management.  While Juels (2004b, p.138) states that “the aim of EPCglobal is to see RFID tags supplant barcodes”, 
according to EPCglobal (2005c, p.11) their explicit aims were: 
 “To facilitate the exchange of information and physical objects between trading partners.” 
 “To foster the existence of a competitive marketplace for system components.” 
 “To encourage innovation.” 
 
In addition, while not explicitly focused on security the standards also purport to (EPCglobal, 2005c, p.12): 
 Promote a secure environment for the use of RFID systems, through either built in security features or 
recommending ‘best practice’. 
 Protect both individual and organisational privacy. 
 
Having already demonstrated a successful eavesdropping attack against a Generation One EPC setup using a custom 
made device (Bolan, 2008) which outlined RFID interception the next logical step was to establish if communication 
spoofing could be successfully carried out.  In computing the term ‘spoofing’, historically referred to the creation of 
TCP/IP packets using another’s IP address thereby gaining some advantage (Basta & Hatton, 2008).  A classic example 
of such an attack is given in the field of cryptography in the form of a man in the middle attack where an attacker uses 
spoofing to fool both parties in a communication that he is the other party. Thus the attacker receives all communications 
without the need for cryptanalytic activities. This type of attack is detailed in the figure below. 
 
Proceedings of the 7th Australian Information Security Management Conference 
 
19| P a g e  
 
 
Figure 1 – Man in the Middle Attack 
 
In the above example the attacking agent must monitor the packets transferring from the client to the server. When 
enough packets have been read the attacking agent then uses this information to send its own packets to the server who 
believes they are communicating with the client.  Given such an attack type the question was posed might such an attack 
be applied to EPC RFID systems? 
CONSTRUCTION OF AN EPC RFID SPOOFING ATTACK 
The first consideration in answering this question was to reinvestigate the basic components of an RFID system to 
determine lines of communication that may be vulnerable to such an attack. In order to evaluate the applicability of such 
attacks to RFID systems required the construction of a device that was able to output an RFID signal that would be 
received by a RFID Reader and be thought to be an actual tag. As the previously discussed RFID eavesdropping device 
developed had the capability to transmit it was decided to utilise the same equipment to generate a spoofed signal (figure 
2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – The RFID Spoofing Device 
 
The first step in creating a spoofed tag response was to investigate the functioning of the SCROLLALLID command in 
greater detail. The command (illustrated in figure 3) works as follows (EPCGlobal, 2005b, p.44):  
1. Upon power up and after a preamble is sent by the reader 
2. The Tag transitions to the reply state and backscatters an RN16.  
3. The Interrogator acknowledges the Tag by sending an ACK. 
4. If the Tag receives the ACK with a correct RN16 it backscatters its PC, EPC, and CRC-16 and transitions to the 
acknowledged state.  
5. The Interrogator access the acknowledged tag 
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Figure 3 – The EPC Query Process 
 
Thus the first thing the spoofer had to look for was the tag to reader preamble followed by an inventory query command. 
Normally after this step, as an acknowledgement the tag then backscatters the signal replying with a 16 bit random 
number (RN16), it was decided for simplicity to use the same number in the code for this proof of concept as collisions 
would not be a factor. Interestingly even with a preselected number the chance for a collision with a genuine tags RN16 
is still quite low with the probability that any two or more tags simultaneously generate the same sequence is less than 
0.1% regardless of when the Tags are energized (EPCGlobal, 2005b, p.40). 
 
Once the reader has received the RN16 it responds with a frame sync and an acknowledgement in the form of a standard 
command of two bits (01) and the RN16 used by the tag. This command allows the reader to focus on an individual tag 
as that RN16 should serve as a reasonably unique identifier and other tags receiving the incorrect RN16 will then ignore 
the subsequent commands until a new communication round is started (EPCGlobal, 2005b, p.52). It is the next round of 
communication that is of real concern to a spoofing based attack where the tag uses the readers ACK signal to 
backscatter its protocol control bits, its EPC identifier and a 16 bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-16) to the reader. If 
the EPC tag number could be emulated then the reader would naturally assume that it has connected to a valid EPC tag 
and would then establish further communication. 
 
Given these consideration the procedure for tag spoofing may be summarised as follows: 
1. Upon power up and after a preamble is sent by the reader 
2. The Spoofer backscatters any RN16.  
3. The Interrogator acknowledges the Tag by sending an ACK. 
4. If the Tag receives the ACK and ignores checking responding with a spoofed PC, EPC, and CRC-16 
5. The reader then accepts the spoofer as a valid tag and adds it to an inventory of contactable tags 
 
The initial concern was to ensure that the experiment was free from outside interference allowing the researcher to rule 
out outside factors as having an impact on the results. To this end a purpose built faraday cage was utilised as previous 
testing had already demonstrated its efficacy in isolating the testing rig from outside ‘noise’ (Bolan, 2008). The next step 
was the construction of a test to baseline normal behaviour which might later be used to compare the result of any test to 
ensure that spoofing had been successful. The construction of this setup used a normal EPC Class One tag being 
inventoried by a laptop setup with a WJ45 RFID Reader. The tag was then left to inventory over a 5 minute period and 
the software was set to log to a comma separated values file. With the baseline established the setup for the spoof 
experiment could be conducted. The setup for this experiment was kept similar to the baseline test with the only change 
being the replacement of the tag used in the baseline with the RFID Tag Spoofer device. This experimental setup is 
illustrated in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 – Experimental Setup 
 
To assist in the demonstration of a successful spoofing attack the RFID tag spoofer was coded to replicate the EPC 
identifier of the baseline tag. As this was a proof of concept experiment a successful test would only have to demonstrate 
that a device could successfully get a valid RFID reader to log its interaction as a successful inventory and thus save the 
‘spoofed’ EPC identifier to the .csv log file. The test would be considered unsuccessful if the reader was able to 
determine that the communication did not comply with the expected communication protocol and thus failed to log the 
EPC identification to its inventory. To guarantee that the original baseline tag was not influencing the results of the 
experiment despite the faraday cage, it was moved beyond the distance the reader was cable of receiving. 
 
For this experiment there were two ‘independent variables’. Firstly, the status of the ‘Responding Device’ is a binary 
state variable with either the spoofer or the tag present. The second independent variable was which RFID tag from the 
experimental sample was being read or spoofed. Dependent variables are defined as the measurable factors which occur 
as a result of a change in one or more independent variables, therefore for this experiment the dependant variable was the 
‘Tag read status’. The status of a Tag read for this experiment is also a binary state variable with either the Reader unit 
being able to successfully register a tag or spoofing response during a tag inventory round or registering an invalid 
response. These variables are explicitly stated along with their possible values in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Experimental Variable 
Type Name Values 
Independent Variable Responding Agent TAG | SPOOFER 
Independent Variable RFID Tag Number Tag Dependant 
Dependent Variable Tag Read YES | NO 
 
The ‘confounding variables’ facing this experiment was the manufacture and operating status of the RFID tags in the 
sample and the functioning of the RFID spoofing device. To limit the influence of the variable, every tag in the sample 
population was tested for operation both prior and post experiment. In addition the sample size and the number of tests 
selected also minimised the impact of this factor. The results from the tests are detailed in the next section. 
RESULTS 
For the tag spoofing experiment the control group was first done across a range of five tags, whereby an actual tag was 
inventoried over a fixed period. During these control tests the tag (tags 1 through 5) exhibit a normal inventory rate of 
around 2.48 inventory responses per second.  This baseline is contrasted with the responses from the RFID spoofer where 
the response rate of the spoofing device was much lower on average with a range of values averaging 0.977 responses 
per second. The responses are graphed in figure 5 which clearly illustrates the high but separate correlation between the 
two distinct groups. 
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Figure 5 – Actual vs Spoofed Response rates 
 
With the success of the initial results a second grouping was tested (figure 6) to show the responses from a switch 
between an actual tag to the spoofing device and then from the spoofing device to an actual tag. Again there is a 
noticeable drop-off in inventory response between the actual Tag and the spoofed response with the addition of small 
periods of inactivity when the physical switch of the tag and spoofer occurred within the Faraday cage.  
 
Figure 6 – Tag to Spoofer (Switch Comparisons) 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated a successful spoofing attack against a Generation One EPC setup using a custom made 
device. Such results were predicted due to tlack of any significant measure within the EPC Standards to prevent such an 
attack from occurring. These findings further add to the increasing number of spoofing based attacks cited against other 
RFID systems and standards (Sarma et al., 2002; Juels, 2006). 
 
There has been some agurement in the RFID community that such an attack would become a more difficult exercise with 
the addition of encryption to the standard, however it is notable that the second generation of the standard still lacks this 
feature (EPC Global, 2005b). Such an oversight may be in part attributable to the difficulty of implementing a secure 
encryption method that is able to cope with the fast response – computational limited environments offered by passive 
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RFID systems. Such limitiations mean that new and innovative encryption schemes are required that will allow for secure 
communication within small operational windows and achieveable with limited resources.  
 
A range of schemes purport to have the solution to this challenge but none has yet to gain acceptance into the EPC 
standard, a standard which aims to unite vendors at every level across the supply chain and has few if any rivals in its 
efforts. Unfortunately, until the standard adopts even a basic encryption algorithm all transmissions conducted with RFID 
equipment must be considered to be insecure, and thus it is clear that current implementations may well prove easy 
targets for spoofing based attacks. 
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